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Abstract 
The paper addresses the question of optimal development of a developing 
economy. The framework presented, it is believed, can be of help in thinking 
about policies relating, inter alia, to population growth, inter-sectoral migra-
tion, agriculture-industry relationship, wages in different sectors, and income 
distribution in an inter-connected way in the context of optimal development 
of an economy with an informal sector. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to address the question of optimal development of a de-
veloping economy with an informal sector. The problem of planned optimal de-
velopment in a dual economy—with the economy sectorised into an advanced 
or modern and a traditional or rural sector—was investigated in the literature in 
the 1960s and 1970s (see, among others, [1] [2] [3]). That literature assumed that 
the advanced sector of the economy is fully planned so that it is possible for the 
planners to control the level of employment as well as consumption directly. It 
was further assumed that the government has direct control over the process of 
rural-urban migration. It was then shown that under such conditions there exists 
a unique optimal growth path that will take the economy from any initial state to 
a unique steady-state. 
However, today it seems unreasonable to assume that the modern sector of 
the economy is or can be fully planned. Instead, it would appear more appropri-
ate to assume that while the planners can have control over the wage in the ad-
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vanced sector—which we shall call the formal sector below—through wage leg-
islation, the producers in that sector fix employment by profit maximization. It 
would also appear reasonable to assume that the government has no direct con-
trol over the process of rural-urban migration. 
In recent years, the informal sector has become an important focus of research 
and in the presence of an informal sector, the economy can be sectorised into 
rural, informal and formal sectors (with the last two sectors being assumed to be 
located in the urban area).1 Empirical evidence increasingly suggests that an 
overwhelmingly large number of migrants from the rural to the urban area mi-
grate to the informal sector and without any thoughts of obtaining jobs in the 
formal sector; further that there is very little job search activity by the migrant 
workers in the informal sector.2 In the analysis below we shall, therefore, assume, 
for simplicity, that people not born in the urban area do not get formal sector 
jobs or believe that they can get such jobs. 
Our aim in this paper is to model such an economy to investigate the exis-
tence of a steady-state and to study the properties of the optimal path. We shall 
use numerical examples to illustrate the model.  
2. The Model and the Steady-State 
We take a one-good economy. Output in the formal sector is ( ),h K F , where h 
is linear homogeneous, K and F are formal sector capital stock and employment, 
respectively. Both the rural and informal sector outputs are produced with la-
bour alone. L is the total labour in the urban area (consisting of workers em-
ployed in the formal and informal sectors). 
The migration function is given by ( )( ) 1mF v w l− − , where v is the informal 
sector wage and 𝑤𝑤 the rural sector wage. That is, the proportion of rural popu-
lation who migrate from the rural to the urban area is a function of the differ-
ence between v and the rural sector wage, w, and the greater the difference, the 
greater will be this proportion.3 The informal sector wage, v, is positively related 
to the number of workers in the formal sector4 and negatively related to the 
number of workers in the urban area. The rural sector wage, w, is negatively re-
lated to the number of workers in the rural area. We shall employ two parame-
ters γ  and β  to reflect the demand for labour in the informal and rural sec-
 
 
1For a model of a developing economy that systematically incorporates an informal sector, see [7] 
[8]. 
2See, for example, [7] [9] [10] [11]. These empirical findings are in contradiction to the basic as-
sumptions underlying the [12] and [13]-type models. As [14] noted in his article in the Handbook of 
Development Economics, “Todaro’s job-lottery and high unemployment view of the labour market 
in the Third World simply fails to pass the test of evidence”. 
3There are both psychological and other costs involved in migration, and while some rural dwellers 
will migrate if v is marginally higher than w, others, perhaps of less adventurous spirit or more at-
tuned to the rural way of life, would be motivated to migrate only if the difference between v and w 
is very much greater. Potential migrants, in other words, have different levels of inertia in the face of 
a given difference between v and w, so that the greater the difference between v and w the greater 
will be the proportion of rural dwellers who would actually migrate. 
4A greater number of workers in the formal sector will, ceteris paribus, tend to decrease the labour 
supply to the informal sector and so tend to increase the informal sector wage, v. 
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tors, respectively. (We shall argue later in Section 4 that these parameters are 
susceptible to influences by government policies). We assume that all wages are 
consumed and all formal sector profit is invested.5 
The planners fix the formal sector wage rate, *v . The producers in the formal 
sector fix employment by profit maximization. Hence ( )* ,fv h k f=  so that 
( )*,f g k v= . (The lower case letters denote the corresponding upper case va-
riables divided by population N. We shall henceforth talk in terms of such inten-
sive variables only). To ensure that the formal sector labour demand is satisfied, 
we assume that *v vα≥ , where 1α ≥ . 
With the formal sector wage, *v , as the control variable, we have the follow-
ing planning problem: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )*0max 1 e dtfu v l f u v l u w tδ
∞ − + − + − ∫           (1) 
(where u  is the individual’s utility function (which depends on income alone); 
0nδ φ= − > , φ  being the rate of discount and n  the exponential rate of 
population growth). 
The problem is defined by the Hamiltonian 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
*
*
1
,
1
k
l m
H fu v l f u v l u w
h k f v f nk
F v w l
λ
λ
= + − + −
 + − − 
+ − −                 
 (2) 
The state variables l  and k  are governed by the equations: 
( ) *,k h k f v f nk= − −                      (3) 
( )( )1ml F v w l= − −                        (4) 
The control variable *v  must obey the constraint: *v vα≥  with fv
l
γ
=  
and 
1
w
l
β
=
−
. In the numerical example, we take ( )
1 2
3 3,h k f k f=  and 
( ) 1u c
c
= − .6 Knowing that *fh v=  and
1
32
3f
kh
f
 
=  
 
, we can rewrite v  in 
function of *v : 3
8
27
kv
lv
γ
∗= . Thus the condition 
*v vα≥  can be rewritten as 
1
4* 8
27
kv
l
αγ ≥  
 
. Therefore, the Hamiltonian can be expressed as 
 
 
5Capital accumulation, it will be recalled, is assumed to take place only in the formal sector. 
6We are assuming production to be Cobb-Douglas and the utility function we use means that we 
value an extra unit of consumption accruing to a particular group, say, group A four times as much 
as a unit accruing to another group B if group B has consumption per head twice as large as group 
A. It would, of course, be possible to work with other utility functions.  For interest, we did some 
exercises using ( ) elogu c c= . The results in these cases turned out to be not that different from 
those obtained by using ( ) 1u c
c
= − . 
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( )
( )
3
23
4
*
2 3 3
8 27 18 27
827
4 8 8 1
19 27 27k l m
kl lv lk vH
klv
k v k knk F l
lv v lv
γ β
γ β
λ λ
∗
∗
∗
∗ ∗ ∗
 −  −∗ = − − −
    + − − + − −    −         
 (5) 
Or, with reducing what can be reduced: 
( )22 3
4 2
3
18 27 4
827 27
8 1 1
27
k
i m
lk l v l kH nk
kv v
kF
lv
λ
γ γ β
γ
λ β
∗
∗ ∗
∗
−   = − − − − + −     
   + − −   
   
        (6) 
Thus the Lagrangian is, in function of *v : 
1
4* 8
27
kH m v
l
αγ   Φ = + −    
 
                   (7) 
The differential calculations to maximize the Hamiltonian lead to: 
2 3
4 2 2 3
88 27 4 1 1
27 8 27 27
m
k l
FH l v n
k lv k v v
γ
λ λ
γ
∗
∗ ∗ ∗
∂     = − + + − + −   ∂     
       (8) 
( )3
3 2
2 1 827 1
4 27
l ml F kH lv
l k v l
λ γ
γ γ β
∗
∗
− ∂
= − − + − 
∂  
              (9) 
Therefore, using ( )k kHk λ δλ
∂
= − −
∂
  and ( )l lHl λ δλ
∂
= − −
∂
 , where , lkλ λ   
are the temporal derivatives of ,k lλ λ  respectively, we obtain: 
2 3
4 2 2 3
88 27 4 11
27 8 27 27
l m
k k
Fl v n
lv k v v
λ
λ λ δ
γ
∗
∗ ∗ ∗
   = − + + − + −     
        (10) 
( )3
3 2
2 1 827 1
4 27
m
l l
l F klv
k v l
γ
λ λ δ
γ γ β
∗
∗
−  = − + + +  

           
 (11) 
For the Lagrangian we have: 
6
2 5
* 3 2 2 *
33
38 4 12 1 0
27
l m
k
l v
F kk m
lv v v k v
λ γ
λ
γ
∗
∗ ∗
  
  ∂Φ    = − − − − + =  ∂  
 
 
     (12) 
The governing differential equations of the state variables ,k l  are now: 
*2
4
27
kk nk
v
= −                         (13) 
1 1ml F f l
γ β
  = − −  
  
                     (14) 
The stationary values of , , ,k l l kλ λ  can be obtained as follows: 
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2 3
4 2 2
3
27 4
27 8 27
8 11 0
7
8
2
stat stat
stat
kstat stat stat
stat
l m
stat s
stat
k
tat
l v n
v k v
F
v l
λ δ
γ
γ
λ
λ
∗
∗ ∗
∗
 − + + −  
 + −

=
=


        (15) 
( )3
3 2
2 1 827 1 0
4 27
stat statstat stat
stat m
lstat stat stat
stat
l
l F kl v
k v l
γ
λ δ
γ βγ
λ ∗
∗
=
−  
+ + + = 
 
−     (16) 
2
4 0
27
stat
stat stat
stat
kk nk
v∗
= − =                    (17) 
1 1 0stat statm statl F f l
γ β
  = − − =  
  
                 (18) 
From here it is easy to extract: 
2 3
9
statv
n
∗ =                         (20) 
stat
stat
stat
fl
f
γ
γ β
=
+
                       (21) 
( )3
3 2
2 11 27
4
8
27
statstat stat
stat
stat
l stat
m
stat stat
ll v
k
F k
v l
γ βγ
λ
γ
δ
∗
∗
 −
 − −
 
 =
+
             
 (21) 
2 3
2 4 3
2
827 8 11
8 27 27
4
27
statstat stat
l m
stat stat stat stat
stat
k
stat
Fl v
k v v l
n
v
λ γ
γ
λ
δ
∗
∗ ∗
∗
  − − −  
  =
+ −
       
 (22) 
We now assume that 0m = , which is equivalent to 
1
4* 8
27
kv
l
αγ >  
 
. In such 
case, we need to calculate statk  from the equation * 0
H
v
∂
=
∂
, i.e., when we have 
used the expression of the stationaries written above: 
6
2 5
2 2 *
33
34 12 1 0
stat stat
stat stat
stat l m
kstat stat stat stat
l v
F k
v k v l
λ γ
λ
γ
∗
∗
 
    − − − − = 
       
 (23) 
Thus we have an equation for statk  that depends only on  statv∗  and statl . 
These last two stationaries can be directly obtained from the problem parameters; 
we can therefore solve numerically the equation above (for example with a 
Newton-Raphson algorithm) to obtain ,stat statlk λ  and statkλ . 
In case of 0m > , which corresponds to *v  being constrained, we can write 
1
48
27
stat kv
l
αγ∗  =  
 
. In such scenario we obtain: 
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2
2
27
stat
stat lk
nαγ
=
                       
 (24) 
2 3
9
2 3
9
stat nl
n
β
α
α
 
−  
 =                      (25) 
The other stationary values can be then calculated from these. 
The steady state solution (as well as the transient) to the maximization prob-
lem has to satisfy certain restrictions, namely, 0 statk<  and 0 1statl< < . These 
conditions are equivalent to 0 1statl< <  which after some rearrangements leads  
to max
2 3
9 n
β β
α
< = . 
We have obtained the stationaries in the two cases where the condition on *v  
is binding or not. In addition, it can be observed that 
stat
stat stat
stat
fv f
l
γ
γ β= = +  
and  
1
stat stat
statw fl
β
γ β= = +
−
. Therefore, at the steady state solution 
stat stat statv w fγ β= = + . 
3. The Optimal Path 
The optimal path can be obtained by maximizing the utility integral (discretizing 
the ordinary differential equations (ODEs) with a fourth order Runge-Kutta 
scheme) or by using the Hamiltonian where, in the application considered below, 
the coupled system of ODEs is discretized with an adaptive fourth-fifth order 
Runge-Kutta method7. The parameters that describe the behaviour of the model 
are , , , ,mF nα β γ  and δ . In what follows we first present results obtained with 
a particular set of these parameter values and initial conditions. Then in the next 
section we show how the effects of changes in these parameter values can be stu-
died in a convenient way within the framework presented here. 
The set of parameter values and initial conditions we use in this section are in 
Table 1. 
Brief justifications for using these parameter values as a starting point are as 
follows8. We assume that a large number of people are available for work in the 
formal sector and that any premium that the formal sector employers may need 
 
 
7A fourth-order fixed-step explicit Runge-Kutta method is chosen to discretize the set of differential 
equations. This selection owes to the proven numerical stability of the method and also to the rela-
tively low error ( ( )4O h , where h is the step size) for the computational cost of each iteration. The 
reason for not choosing a variable step methodology is that in this case to solve the optimization 
problem, the computational cost increases significantly, since to calculate the integral of the mini-
mization problem a large number of points were required to reduce the errors. Therefore, a variable 
step methodology would be required to have a certain maximum step size, thus making the variable 
step size algorithm redundant. 
8For fuller justifications of the parameter values and the initial conditions used than provided here, 
the interested reader is referred to the analysis in [8] [10]. Many of the parameter values and initial 
conditions used here are also within the range of values used in previous simulation studies in the 
literature. 
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to pay to attract workers to that sector is, therefore, likely to be very small, and 
accordingly we have set 1.1α = . We have set the value of γ  higher than that of 
β . These parameters, it will be recalled, are included to reflect the demand for 
labour in the informal and rural sectors, respectively. These demands, in the in-
terpretation adopted in this paper, are dependent on government policies (this is 
elaborated in Section 4 below). It is assumed that the relevant government poli-
cies can be more effectively pursued and implemented in the urban than in the 
dispersed and remote rural areas. We also assume the rate of discount (i.e., φ ) 
to be marginally higher than the exponential rate of population growth, and we 
have set 0.01δ = . However, as already mentioned, the effects of assuming dif-
ferent parameter values to those assumed here can be easily studied within the 
framework presented here and this question is addressed in the next section. 
Using the parameter values specified in Table 1, the stationary solution is in Table 2. 
It is also ascertained that at the steady state we have about 60 percent of 
workers in the formal sector, 10 percent in the informal sector, and 30 percent in 
the rural sector. Graphs tracing the paths of the formal sector wage, the informal 
sector wage, capital and urban labour force are shown in Figures 1-4, respec-
tively. We have also computed the evolution of the Gini coefficient along the op-
timal path (Figure 5). It will be noted that the values of the Gini coefficient are 
very low. This is not surprising: the steady state values of the formal, informal, 
and rural sector wages are, as we have seen, 2.4 and 2.2, respectively. The wage 
differences are thus really small, not even a 10 percent. (The average wage is ap-
proximately 2.3 which means that the difference between the average and the 
extremes is less than 5 per cent). Nevertheless, despite the low values of the Gini 
coefficient, the evolution of the Gini coefficient traces out a path that looks 
somewhat like an inverted U-shaped curve. It was, of course, the contention of 
[4] that income inequality first increases and then declines with economic de-
velopment and a large literature has since been devoted to exploring this and re-
lated issues.9 It is also clear that with the set of parameter values used, it takes a 
very long time for the steady state to be achieved.10 It is, therefore, of some in-
terest to note that much earlier, [5] too, in the context of a discussion about the 
timescale of the neo-classical growth model, found the time required for the  
 
Table 1. Parameter values and initial conditions. 
α  β  γ  δ  mF  n  0k  0l  
1.1 0.664 2.5 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.5 0.3 
 
Table 2. Stationary solution. 
stat
lλ  
stat
kλ  *statv  statv  statk  statl  
1.2264 0.4747 2.4343 2.213 30.1665 0.7 
 
 
9See, among others, [15] [16] [17] [18]. 
10We have purposely not defined the X-coordinates of Figures 1-5 to allow for the degree of flexibility 
prevailing in different economies at different times, but a time unit of, say, half-a-year would probably 
capture the time span that we have in mind in the context of the economy that we have modelled. 
P. C. Bhattacharya 
 
 
DOI: 10.4236/jamp.2017.59153 1815 Journal of Applied Mathematics and Physics 
 
 
Figure 1. The optimal path of the formal sector wage, *.v  
 
 
Figure 2. The path of the informal sector wage, .v  
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Figure 3. The path of capital, .k  
 
 
Figure 4. The evolution of urban population, .l  
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Figure 5. The evolution of Gini coefficient. 
 
steady state to be achieved to be similarly long. (However, by specifying different 
initial conditions and parameter values to those specified here, it would be poss-
ible to reduce the time required for the steady state to be achieved in our model 
and this question is being explored in a separate paper). 
4. Parameter Values, Feasibility Regions, and Steady State 
Solutions 
In this section we examine how the effects of changes in the parameter values 
can be studied in a convenient way within the framework presented here. The 
fact that the values of all of these parameters can be influenced by government 
policies makes this exercise particularly interesting. The parameter n (the rate of 
population growth) can clearly be influenced by government policies. In the in-
troduction and in the preceding section, we referred to the parameters γ  and 
β  as reflecting the demand for labour in the informal and rural sectors, respec-
tively. If technical progress in the rural sector is labour augmenting (as indeed 
the green revolution technology, which made double and multiple cropping 
possible, had been), then this would, ceteris paribus, tend to increase the de-
mand for labour in the rural sector.11 Whether technical progress in the rural 
sector is labour augmenting or not can be influenced by the government via the 
nature and extent of its extension services, its factor pricing policies and its R & 
D activities.12 Similarly, the value of the parameter γ  can be influenced by poli-
 
 
11We are assuming that the demand for final output rises with economic development. 
12As is well known, agricultural technology, unlike industrial technology, cannot be borrowed 
wholesale from abroad. It has to a great extent to be indigenously developed to suit local soil and 
climatic conditions, etc. 
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cies relating to land use, credit facilities, property rights and those bearing on the 
sub-contracting relationships between the formal and informal sector firms in 
the urban area. The value of the parameter α  can be influenced through trade 
union and labour legislation. 
In examining the effects of changes in these parameter values, a convenient 
way of proceeding would be to show how changing the values of any two of the 
parameters, while holding the values of the other parameters unchanged, would 
affect the steady state solutions. A map of feasible and unfeasible regions can 
then be provided for each case. There are, of course, 15 such cases which can be 
considered.13 Here we concentrate on considering the case of changes in α  and 
β . Results are shown in Figures 6-9. A feasibility map for α  and β  values 
is provided in Figure 10. The Gini coefficient sensitivity analysis is provided in 
Figure 11 and Figure 12. Results showing the effects of changes in the other 
combinations of parameter values can be similarly presented. They are not pre-
sented here to save space, but are available in [6]. However, for the interested 
reader we present below a summary of some of the findings. 
It is seen that the parameters mF  and δ  do not play any role in determin-
ing the stationary values of the variables *, ,v k l  and v . mF  controls the rate 
of migration but is not related to the stationary values. δ  appears in the expo-
nential term of the integral and therefore controls how fast a (quasi) steady-state  
 
 
Figure 6. Evolution of *v  vis-a-vis α  and β . The steady state value of *v  is only 
dictated by n, therefore, no changes occur when α  and β  are modified. 
 
 
13The cases are: changes in α  and β ; α  and γ ; α  and mF ; α  and n ; α  and δ ; β  
and γ ; β  and n ; β  and mF ; β  and δ ; γ  and mF ; γ  and n ; γ  and δ ; mF  and 
n ; mF  and δ ; and n  and δ . 
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Figure 7. β  exerts little influence on the steady-state values of v  for large values of α . 
For smaller values, when β  tends to zero, the value of v  is dependent on ,γ α  and 
n . A non-linear trend appears in that region. On the other hand, α  has a greater do-
minance on the behaviour of v , which decreases nonlinearly as α  increases. Varying 
β  causes small changes in v , whereas α  has a strong and nonlinear influence. Partic-
ularly when α  decreases, v  increases. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. sk  is a positive variable and therefore any negative values should be regarded 
as unfeasible. sk  decays with increasing values of α  and β  albeit with different 
trends. 
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Figure 9. sl  is a positive variable and therefore any negative values should be regarded 
as unfeasible. sl  decays with increasing values of α  and β  with quasi-linear trends. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Feasibility map. The equality constraint ( )*v vα=  is satisfied in most of the 
feasible region. Only very small values of β  and small values of α  satisfy the inequali-
ty constraint. The feasible values of beta are greatly constrained for large values of α . 
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Figure 11. Steady state values of Gini coefficient when α  and β  vary in the range of 1 
to 3 and 0.3 to 5 respectively. Points not drawn represent unfeasible regions. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Gini coefficient decreases for low values of α . The time to steady-state is also 
dependent on this parameter and is rapidly achieved, using this particular set of parame-
ters, for 1.8α ≈ . 
 
is achieved. No unfeasible regions are detected within a reasonable range of val-
ues for these parameters. 
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The parameter γ  similarly does not play much of a role in determining the 
stationary values of *,v l  and v . The stationary value of k , however, is influ-
enced by γ . As γ  increases (decreases), k  decreases (increases). 
As one would expect, the stationary value of *v  depends only on n and re-
mains constant when varying any other parameters. The dependency on n is like  
1
n
, so a singularity can be observed when n tends to zero.  
Finally, the stationary value of k is seen to have a strong dependency on α  
with low values of n. The larger the n, the weaker that dependency is. Also k 
grows fast when n is close to zero (whatever α  is). Nevertheless, this happens 
most markedly when α  closely approximates to one. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have presented a framework for thinking about optimal devel-
opment of an economy with an informal sector. While we assumed a particular 
set of parameter values to derive our results in Section 3, in Section 4 we showed 
how the effects of changes in these parameter values can be studied in a conve-
nient way within the framework presented here. We also derived the evolution 
of the Gini coefficient along the optimal path. We assumed a Cobb-Douglas 
production function and a particular utility function. It would be possible to re-
lax these assumptions and work with other production and utility functions. The 
framework presented here—it is hoped—can be of some help in thinking about 
policies relating, inter alia, to population growth, inter-sectoral migration, agri-
culture-industry relationship, wages in different sectors, and income distribution 
in an inter-connected way in the context of optimal development of an economy 
with an informal sector. 
A list of policy related questions that could be discussed could include the fol-
lowing. If the society, for example, wishes to have a particular distribution of the 
population between the urban and rural areas (or between the various sectors) at 
the steady state, what policies or combinations of policies would be best suited to 
achieve this and what would be the consequences of adopting these policies not 
only for, say, the steady state value of capital, but also for the evolution of in-
come distribution along the optimal path? Similarly, if the society wishes the ru-
ral and urban wages to be equalized within a specified time period, what policies 
could be adopted to achieve this and what would be the consequences of adopt-
ing these policies for income distribution as well as the distribution of people 
between the urban and rural areas along the optimal path? What would be the 
effect of these policies on the steady state value of capital? How would any target 
growth rate of the population affect the evolution of the economy along the op-
timal path? How would any government policy to encourage the demand for la-
bour in the informal sector influence the evolution of the economy along the op-
timal path and the steady state values of urban labour, capital, etc.? How would 
policies to encourage the development and adoption of labour augmenting tech-
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nical progress in the rural sector affect the time to steady state as well as the 
steady state values of the various variables? Clearly, one can think of other ques-
tions along similar lines. 
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